
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5 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Status and Potential of EMP

- l. My discussion with Edward Teller makes me think that the intelligence community should evaluate the status and potential of EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) as an offensive and defensive weapon. The Nuclear Intelligence Panel can contribute to this and I understand the DNA (Defense Nuclear Agency) has a study on it. It is particularly significant as a weapon against command control capabilities which could conceivably short circuit the value of other strategic weapons.
- 2. Will you evaluate this as something which perhaps we should be doing as an intelligence community estimate to gather information and judgments among the policy community.

William J. Casey

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